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Secrecy, Trust, and Dangerous Leisure: Generating Group Cohesion in Voluntary Organizations*

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The development and effects of group cohesion have been a long-standing concern in the small-group literature. Through an ethnographic examination of a leisure activity involving risk—mushroom collecting—we analyze how voluntary leisure groups maintain members' allegiance and affiliation, and thus create cohesion. Trust (communal concern) and secrecy (individual self-interest), based originally on information and subsequently on relationships, are critical to group stability. Groups provide arenas in which new members can place their trust in "experts," thus receiving protective information and developing rewarding relationships to keep them from danger. Yet the openness of information has limits. Competitive relationships, which also tie members to the group, depend on privately held knowledge. As a result, even in cohesive groups committed to mutual support, information is a valued resource. Each member is expected to develop secrets and to shelter them from others in most circumstances. Trust and secrecy are compatible in those voluntary organizations in which all members can gain access to private knowledge while placing their trust in colleagues to share protective information.

As communitarians assert, participation in a voluntary organization encourages—perhaps demands—a sense of belonging (Bellah et al. 1992; Wolfe 1989, 1991). Within small-group research this “belongingness” or “we-ness” is labeled *group cohesion*. Although cohesion has numerous definitions, the standard views suggest that cohesion constitutes those forces which cause members to remain within a group (Festinger, Schachter, and Back 1950:164; Piper et al. 1983) and/or to resist centrifugal forces (Brawley, Carron and Widmeyer 1988; Gross and Martin 1952:553).¹ Cohesion is a variable

intervening between characteristics of group life and outcome variables, notably the success of the group (e.g., survival of the group or stability of membership).² Cohesion is a property of social systems rather than individuals (Frank 1957), even though it is individuals who experience feelings of commitment on which this solidarity is based (Evans and Jarvis 1980; Kanter 1972:72–73).

Although cohesion is often studied in the laboratory, it is important for understanding the processes by which natural groups or organizations provide satisfaction for members, thus increasing their stability (Hechter 1987). In our view, cohesion is linked to a set of cultural processes that regulate group life.

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¹ Kanter's (1972) model of individual “commitment,” grounded in an analysis of nineteenth-century communes,

distinguishes between continuance, cohesion, and control, important processes evident in voluntary total institutions. The social psychological literature on “cohesion” typically conflates the first two and sometimes incorporates the third, emphasizing not the individual's level of commitment but the group's level of cohesion. Commitment is an individual-level variable; cohesion operates collectively.

² Social psychological research, in practice, has used cohesion either as an independent variable that produces outcomes on performance variables (e.g., Evans and Dion 1991; Wheelan 1994) or as a dependent variable that is a function of membership composition, feedback, or group structure (Drescher, Burlingame, and Fuhrman, 1985). Only rarely do researchers explore the variables mediating the effects of cohesion, such as the salience of social norms (Rutkowski, Gruder, and Romer 1983).

Cohesion serves as a collective orientation that depends on social relations and produces a group "culture" (Eder 1988; Fine 1979; Owen 1985; Sherif et al. 1961) which organizes interaction and encourages continued participation (Shaw 1981:216-17).

To explore the production of cohesion, we focus on voluntary organizations. Groups with the authority to enforce explicit social control over participants (e.g., the classroom or the shop floor) have less need to be concerned about affiliation than do voluntary groups. Specifically we examine leisure groups that involve some measure of risk, a feature which is linked experimentally to the presence of cohesion (Harrison and Connors 1984:68; Stokes 1983) and in which a status system among participants develops, implying competition.

Leisure groups, because force and moral compunction are absent, are ideal organizations for examining how affiliation arises in the face of individual interest. If individual interest is privileged, one might say, the need for solidarity is diminished except when it serves instrumental goals. Yet if this were true, voluntary groups would be far less stable than they are. Groups in which members engage in *dangerous* leisure, because of their subcultural character (i.e., sharing tasks beyond the skills of most outsiders) and because of the need for mutual aid in achieving desired ends and avoiding tragic outcomes, are particularly likely to encourage communal affiliation. Status within the group and satisfaction from the activity flow from individual achievement.

All leisure worlds depend for their survival on providing egoistic satisfaction (Irwin 1977; Stebbins 1992); they are grounded in self-interest. The need for cohesion is particularly salient in a society such as ours, which reverses self-interest and competition (Shils 1956:21; Turner 1987:96-104). Thus, the paradox: How is voluntary organization possible, given the tension between solidarity and individualism? As Erving Goffman remarked famously in his essay "Fun in Games,"

Games can be fun to play, and fun alone is the approved reason for playing them. The individual, in contrast to his treatment of "serious" activity, claims a right to complain about a game that does not pay its way in immediate pleasure and, whether the game is pleasurable or not, to

plead a slight excuse, such as an indisposition of mood, for not participating. (1961:17).

Yet in this passage Goffman ignores the relational context in which many games occur. In leisure scenes an egoistic perspective is linked inextricably to a need for communal belonging. Relationships and social identity may be as important as the activity itself (Turner 1987:103): we often play without complaint even when we "don't feel like it." If a leisure group is to remain stable, it must develop benefits that begin with and then transcend the activity for which individuals join. Once participants become knowledgeable, many leisure activities can be performed outside the organizational order.³ As a result, the activities by themselves do not necessarily bind actors to the group; other forces must provide that social glue.

One reason why people participate in leisure organizations is simple: they receive benefits that outweigh the costs of participation, and this ratio is more favorable than that for nonparticipation. To some degree, this simple model is true. People do not participate in organizations unless they "get something out of it." If this were the entire basis of participation, however, one might expect that leisure organizations would be very fragile, and that individuals would be neutral rather than emotionally committed to the group. Many leisure participants, particularly the active participants, have a long-term allegiance that transcends immediate benefits. The "groupness" of the scene is powerful (Stebbins 1979) and stabilizes individuals' attachment, thus building cohesion.

The successful leisure organization provides resources necessary to facilitate activities (planned outings, equipment, information) (Fine 1989; Hoggett and Bishop 1986), but these resources provide only a tenuous means of linking persons to the organization. By themselves, such resources do not create cohesion, short of the benefits the individual receives immediately in exchange for the expenses of belonging. To increase the tensile

³ Stebbins (1992) observes that leisure activities differ in their collective character. Some, such as sports teams, theater troupes, or musical ensembles, demand group participation. In those cases, the organization provides for training and sharing interest; in addition, participation in the organization constitutes the "doing" of leisure. In contrast, we generalize from organizations that cater to individuals interested in activities that can be performed solo or in small groups outside the organization.

strength of organizational existence, cohesion is essential. The emotional investment and social identity inherent in voluntary organizations have a power that transcends the ostensibly voluntary character and raises the exit costs.

Aside from the content of their activities, many enthusiasts treasure the company of others. They choose to belong to an *organized group*, even though they could engage in these activities by themselves or by developing private dyadic or group relationships. Yet "sociable organizations" (Aldrich 1971) are valued; a group of persons with common interests magnifies the pleasures derived from doing the activity. These individuals select a social setting that motivates them to rely on, care about, and share with others. This situation leads to identity work (Snow and Anderson 1987) in which participants—through a sense of belonging—come to see themselves as characterized by the activity, rather than seeing the activity merely as something they do.

Generating cohesion in a social system that relies on individual interest demands a recognition of the interplay between integrating and centrifugal forces. To develop this recognition, we focus on two fundamental, seemingly oppositional forces, *trust* and *secrecy*, which often combine to create social integration, to stabilize leisure organization, and to provide a basis of communal allegiance.⁴ Trust and secrecy operate by regulating information and building meaningful, extended relationships. An organization provides the environment in which relationships can flourish, and experiences and knowledge can be shared. This is particularly important in risky situations involving external dangers.⁵

⁴ We do not make the extreme claim that all leisure groups have the same mix of trust and secrecy. Groups in which danger is recognized establish mechanisms for establishing trust. Groups that are grounded on the comparative ranking among members, which is based on achievement (competition), develop information preserves; they avoid sharing resources (mushrooms, caving routes) or keep private their styles of performance (parachuting, bungee jumping). Some risky groups may have relatively little secrecy, and vice versa, but we claim that groups involving risk typically have an achievement-based status hierarchy which involves protected information.

⁵ Some measure of trust is found in all organizations in which negative outcomes are possible. In stamp collection, for example, novices might trust others to inform

To suggest that the combination of trust and secrecy provides the basis for the existence of voluntary organizations devoted to competitive, risky activities is to recognize a profound irony: that the tension between attachment (trust) and competition (secrecy) builds social order. Both attachment and competition require an arena to flourish: the leisure group provides this space.

What begins with the sharing or withholding of knowledge eventually becomes a basis for establishing tight-knit social connections, linked both to status claims and to emotional ties. The establishment of these connections, with their boundaries of legitimate information domains, creates organizational stability. Voluntary allegiance depends on the existence of both a public and a private sphere. In an effective organization, members have expectations about how much of their selves and knowledge to invest in the collective good, and how much to shelter. This play of persons and information constitutes the basis of collective attachment and personal satisfaction.

We begin this project with an ethnographic description of mushroom collection, a voluntary but risky social world. We describe how trust and secrecy are socially constructed in a mycological society, and argue that both depend on relationship status, allegiance, and social control; yet both contribute the creation of group cohesion. We conclude by discussing the extent to which the core concepts of trust and secrecy can be generalized to other spheres of social life.

THE WORLD OF MUSHROOMERS

The first author conducted participant observation and in-depth interviews with mushroom collectors, a voluntary leisure community that relies on the existence of trust and secrecy. He focused on those groups which facilitate this environmental leisure activity. Members of mycological societies routinely place their welfare in the hands of others by accepting their judgments of edibility. Further, personal benefits accrue from accepting communal authority in that one's knowledge and the range of mushrooms

them about stamp values or how to preserve their collections safely. Of course physical dangers, and the edgework that accompanies them, make the need for trust even more explicit (Lyng 1990).

one consumes are increased. The combined existence of costs and benefits underlines the critical role of trust. Yet secrecy, too, is crucial because of the members' competitiveness in finding mushrooms. This fact reveals their desire to achieve personal benefits to which all members are not entitled by membership alone.

The Minnesota Mycological Society,⁶ founded in 1898, is the second oldest continuously active amateur mushroom society in the United States. In most major metropolitan areas, particularly in the northeast, the midwest, and the west, groups of amateurs have banded together for support and community. The club consists primarily of amateurs; although professional mycologists are welcome to join, none were active members of the Minnesota club during the period of observation.

As in many voluntary organizations, segmented interest groups exist under the rubric of the larger organization. Some of the approximately 200 members are interested primarily in examining mushrooms from a quasi-scientific perspective; these individuals sometimes are labeled *amateur mycologists*. Some enjoy compiling lists or collections of the mushrooms they find; others, known as *pot hunters*, collect mushrooms to eat (i.e., for the pot). For still others, photography is their first love. Although the members of the organization are friendly and mutually supportive, tension occasionally flares over the division of club resources between interest groups.

The Minnesota Mycological Society meets one evening a week for approximately two hours during the prime mushroom-picking months in Minnesota: May, June, September, and October. At these meetings the president describes the mushrooms that members bring and that the Identification Committee has identified. Members also describe their memorable mushroom finds and, in keeping with norms of secrecy, describe where and how their patches were discovered. At some meetings, members give talks (e.g., on cultivating mushrooms, mushrooms in other countries, or foreign travel) or show slides. In

addition to these weekly meetings, the club organizes approximately a half-dozen forays to state and county parks and to private properties. Two of the forays last for a weekend. The club also holds a banquet in January, and has established a mycology study group that meets once a month to examine mushrooms with microscopes and chemicals. The first author attended most of the meetings, forays, and banquets during a three-year period, and wrote detailed field notes. These notes were supplemented by a questionnaire sent to all members (with a 66% response rate, $n = 129$) and by in-depth interviews with two dozen members of the group, lasting approximately 90 minutes each.

The first author also attended a national foray organized by the North American Mycological Association (NAMA) and two regional forays, one in the midwest and one in the northeast. Data on these forays are supplemented by copies of newsletters published by some two dozen mycological societies. The analysis does not examine all mushroom hunters, but only those who have chosen to join voluntary organizations for this purpose.

ORGANIZING TRUST

Group cohesion depends on making the existence of the group or organization *matter* to individuals, thus bolstering its voluntary character. One fundamental way of doing this is by establishing a cocoon to protect members from the risks of the activity. Trust refers to an actor's belief that a person or collectivity will perform actions (including providing information) that will prove helpful or not detrimental to him or her, thus permitting the establishment of a relationship of cooperation (e.g., Gambetta 1988:217). Yet this perspective, which emphasizes the cognitive, evaluative component of trust, is necessary but not sufficient. Interpretation is possible only in a world of cultural meanings, emotional responses, and social relations—a moral world that depends on what people ought to do, as well as what it is in their interest to do. One not only thinks trust, but feels trust. Although trust depends at first on information judged to be protective, in time it involves valuing the *relationship* in which trust is embedded as well as the information that is acquired (Good 1988; Lewis and

⁶ There is only one mushroom club in the Twin Cities area. We believed it would be disingenuous to create a pseudonym that would not shield the identity of the group as a whole. Following standard ethnographic practice, we use pseudonyms for individuals except when quoting published materials.

Weigert 1985). First, the information is accepted as derived from organizationally validated sources. Subsequently the sources themselves are trusted (McNulty 1994); they are transformed from spokespersons for the group to personal acquaintances. Reputation is an important feature in relationships of trust: those with good reputations are likely to receive information (if they are novices) and to be asked for information (if they are veterans) (Kollock 1994).

The means by which trust commits individuals to an organization is most obvious in the secret society, where the existence of one's membership must be held in confidence. The hidden relations among members constitute the power of the group; breaching these relations threatens the group's existence (Bellman 1981). Yet although secret societies may be a dramatic example of the importance of investing confidence in others, such a connection is significant in any organization that provides protective information on which members rely. Simmel (1950:318) observed that confidence is one of the most important synthetic forces in group life.⁷ It is an intermediate position between knowledge and ignorance, neither of which requires the presence of others. Confidence is social; it reflects *trust* in another or in a group of others. It emerges from the "objectification" of culture (i.e., the segmentation of the self into specialized roles) and from the growth of specialized knowledge, which requires us to rely on others for information necessary for achieving our ends (Giddens 1990:88–89).

We judge and evaluate information provided in socially meaningful contexts. Giddens (1991) writes of a "moving world of normalcy," maintaining that trust is "the outcome of the routinized nature of an uneventful world" and that it creates a protective "cocoon" which makes possible the enactment of the social world and the emergence of meaning. The metaphor of a protective cocoon is important, especially for social scenes, such as those discussed here, which are not routine. Trust is interactional, interpreted, and negotiated, not fully deter-

mined or calculating. Because of its grounding in interaction, trust depends on facework. Yet, insofar as it is institutionalized within an organization, it is also faceless: simultaneously fragile and robust, fluid and consequential (Giddens 1990:88–91).

The trust that participants place in others allows them to see the dangerous world at least as manageable, if not as routine (Donnelly 1994; Vester 1987). Members depend on organizations—and on those who make up the organization—to provide relevant and protective information and to keep that information sheltered from those outside who are deemed to have no right or competence to know. Organizations structure the access points for trust (Giddens 1990:85). As trust in information becomes trust of persons, ties to the organization are strengthened⁸ and lead to the potential for cooperation. Instrumental affiliation becomes emotional attachment.

The establishment of trust locates attachment in rapport and identification, not merely in common interest or spatial copresence. Trust, which originates in confidence in information provided by groups and individuals, and builds on personal commitment to the group (Kanter 1972:65–67), is translated into a "pure" relationship. This relationship, when generalized to the collectivity, produces organizational loyalty (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984:6; Gellner 1988). Trust is a fundamental anchoring dimension of cohesion.

To address the dynamics of trust in organizational life, we examine the awarding, managing, and transforming of trust. Strong pressures are exerted on the new member of an organization to demonstrate regard for others by following their advice—demonstrating that they are trustworthy. As a result, the establishment of trustworthiness becomes critical. One must be socialized to risk and to competence, and the organization must establish procedures—formal or implicit—by which trustworthiness is created. Finally, trust changes over time, from an emphasis on meaning to a more subtle connection with the identity of others and one's relations with them.

⁷ Luhmann (1988:97–99) distinguishes between confidence and trust regarding whether potential negative consequences are considered (trust) or ignored (confidence). In English, at least, this distinction would seem to contradict the fact that the two words are often interchangeable, and the uncertainty as to whether danger is recognized consciously.

⁸ This assumes that the organization is viewed as unified. In some instances, trust (and loyalty) to individuals in factionalized organizations may weaken the organization while strengthening subgroups (Richard Lempert, personal communication, 1995).

Awarding Trust

Trust is particularly likely to be evident when external threats are present. Mycological organizations generate trust by supplying protective information to novices, who find themselves in an uncertain environment. Mushroom collectors must learn how to avoid the possibility of illness, or even death, from consuming “bad” mushrooms. Consequently, the practical question of trust emerges early and dramatically. The first question that novices wish to have answered by “experts” is “Can I eat it?” a blunter version of “What is this?” Not all mushroomers make consumption their central reason for joining a club, but few lack interest in the question.⁹ Eating mushrooms is recognized as potentially dangerous, particularly in view of the publicity accorded the occasional death. Organizations provide both the resources to experience risk and the expertise to cope (Hewitt 1984).

Throughout organizational life, considerable social pressure exists to award trust to members of the group, thus validating the organization. This trust seems to be awarded easily. Novices first taste many species of mushrooms at social events where the mushrooms have been picked and identified by others. This situation poses a delicate problem of impression management for the novice, who cannot personally ascertain whether the species identification is accurate. Should the (often unknown) identifier be trusted? Typically the social pressures are strong enough to ensure consumption, however cautiously and anxiously. Persons who refuse to eat mushrooms prepared by others at a foray or banquet must justify this behavior lest it be assumed that they do not trust their comrades; such a significant affront could disrupt social relations. They must attest through their behavior that they accept identifications by others and acknowledge the legitimacy of a community of competence, even though they personally may be unsure about the proper identification.

At a club foray, a cook prepared a mushroom pate made with some *Amanita fulva* and some *Russulas* (not identified to species), identified by a knowledgeable club member. Both are

edibles, but the *Amanita* is very rarely eaten because of its deadly genus-mates. Many who ate the pate were individuals who told me privately that they had no interest in eating any *Amanitas*, even if edible. The pate becomes a major topic of conversation (field notes).

One fairly new club member who consumed the pate, without realizing at the time that it contained *Amanitas*, told me later that if she had known, “I don’t think it would have stopped me from eating it, because I really have a lot of confidence in the group. And I just have the feeling that nobody is deliberately mixing something up that hadn’t been proved edible” (personal interview).

The absence of an established personal relationship is striking. It emphasizes the extent to which novices will place their trust in the organization; this trust was established previously, but is made relevant by the situation. Such trust represents not only trust in individual expertise, but also, and more prominently, trust in a *system* of expertise.¹⁰ New members are willing to consume potentially deadly mushrooms collected, identified, and cooked by strangers. As the second author, a novice rock climber, said after an energetic climb, “I suddenly realized that I was putting my life in the hands of someone whose last name I didn’t even know.”

The social psychological centrality of this trust is evident in anxious jokes made by veteran mushroomers about using new members as guinea pigs:

The oath taken on induction [into the International Mushroom Pickers Society] indicates their enthusiasm in the mycological pursuits: “I solemnly promise to cherish the brotherhood and good fellowship of my brother IMPS, even to the extent of willingness to serve as a mushroom taster of wild mushrooms for a probationary period of one year *without liability to our organization if rigor mortis sets in due to ingestion of nonedible fungi*” (Rosen 1982: 18–19).

Jerry, the club president, jokes at a meeting about the birch polypore, which some field guides say is edible, but is tough and according to some, is bitter: “I’d like to encourage someone else to try it and tell me.” He adds:

¹⁰ This point raises the delicate issue of relations among novices. Novices often announce their lack of expertise to others to avoid responsibility for expertise. This announcement, however, is voluntary; a novice potentially could harm others and thus weaken the bonds of trust. As a result, in most instances in which expertise is crucial, experts are assigned to monitor the information (and comestibles) that are distributed.

⁹ Of the 129 members of the Minnesota Mycological Society who responded to my questionnaire, 94 percent said they had eaten wild mushrooms.

"By the way, new members, if you join, you're guinea pigs for the first year. [Laughter.] Not so at all. Just joking" (field notes).

The insistence on trust is found throughout leisure organizations, and thus legitimates the organization. To alleviate the concern about the universality of trust, organizations typically establish roles that are validated as deserving trust while maintaining the impression that the organization as a whole is trustworthy.

Managing Risk

To ensure that members can be trusted, socialization becomes essential. It is desired both by the participants, who voluntarily selected this domain, and by organizational leaders. Only through expertise can one achieve the rewards that attend belonging. Yet, once one belongs to the organization, how is competence to be socialized? Risks exist in sharing one's activities and organizational identity with the untutored. A tension exists between teaching and shunning a novice. As a result, competence and trustworthiness may be hard to acquire: experienced participants may find it more rewarding to share their leisure with other experts rather than to serve as teachers of novices, and thus perhaps to limit what they can accomplish.

A set of social and normative pressures encourages voluntary instruction. In practice, expert members teach novices because of the belief that one should repay one's own socialization with the socialization of others (a form of generational justice, crucial to parenting as well), the satisfaction of generating shared interest, the status rewards of contacts with less knowledgeable persons, and the claim that one's own community will be extended by creating other experts. The challenge for the novice is that to become expert, one must spend time with experts. Thus affiliation must develop, sometimes through collective events (forays) sponsored by the organization.

When mushrooms are to be consumed, particularly those with toxic counterparts, providers may be limited to those whose trustworthiness has been validated by the organization. At the national foray, for instance, only a small number of experienced mushroomers were selected to pick edible amanitas (*Amanita rubescens*) for the tasting

session. These specimens, part of a family with deadly species, were reviewed carefully by a small, even more knowledgeable, identification committee.

For mushroomers the protection against danger¹¹ is social: new members are advised to join a club, take a course, foray with an experienced participant, or ask another person to identify their mushrooms before cooking (e.g., Coombs 1986:23). Novices are encouraged to work initially with more experienced members who can teach "safety." To aid in the development of competence, training may occur at group meetings, or forays may be organized to train (and judge) new members. Novices are often encouraged to attend club meetings and lectures to gain practical information, and simultaneously to cement their attachment to the group. Trust in information provided by the organization and in the members of that community provides a bulwark against danger (Williams 1988).

Transforming Trust

An individual's experience of trust within a group is altered over time: the organization is transformed from an object of trust to an arena of trusting interactions. When joining an organization, most new members simultaneously express interest and ignorance. As a result, the first goal of membership is information, which is provided by group members. For a novice, organizational legitimation is crucial to trust. The group has awarded status to some members (by role or by reputation); the new member trusts these individuals, though perhaps not totally and not without some anxiety. Without trust, the urge to exit is strong. Over time, trust becomes based in shared experience, and evaluation depends on topics on which the judge has some measure of expertise. As the new member becomes more proficient, he or she develops standards of judgment by which to evaluate competence and award trust.

In practice, the novice at first assumes that "mere" membership in an organization be-

¹¹ Mushroom fatalities in the United States are very few, typically no more than a half-dozen a year. Only two of 129 Minnesota mushroomers reported becoming so ill from eating mushrooms that they had to be hospitalized. Only 15 percent had even become ill from eating mushrooms, however minor the discomfort.

stows a "cloak of competence," just as we give those with professional credentials the benefit of the doubt. Because novices rarely begin with highly dangerous or difficult activities (Bryan 1977), the advice given, if in error, will likely be relatively inconsequential. For experienced members, who engage in riskier activities, trust must be earned. As in work situations (Haas 1974; Hughes 1971), participants must decide whether they can trust new colleagues; experienced members implicitly evaluate the new members' developing competence before accepting their advice and before developing long-term trusting relations:

One veteran collector tells me: "If someone I don't know really well comes up and offers me some mushrooms that he just picked, I know enough to know that I want to know what he picked. I know enough that I am not just going to eat anything that somebody hands me" (personal interview).

Testing occurs when experienced members judge the extent to which they should trust novices. One veteran recalled, "When we first joined our club we were watched by the long-time members for interest and consistency" (personal letter). In the words of another, "The society was filled with friendly people who shook my hand and welcomed me. Then they waited" (Norvell 1983-84:7).

The trust derives from the relationship, where "knowing well" and "judging highly" combine to establish a zone of trust. Trust gained, however, can become trust lost. Should one identify a poisonous mushroom as an edible species, others would remain suspicious until competence had been demonstrated specifically. In most situations, credibility is lost only once (Hunt 1995; Stuller 1989:92) unless the mistake is defined as reasonable. In fact, those who have a reputation for consuming risky mushrooms, even if they know exactly what they are eating, are mistrusted and/or teased by more conservative members, who profess to avoid anything that those persons might prepare.

As one acquires knowledge, trust changes: the basis of trust is transformed from organizational position to displayed competence. This change alters the role of the organization. At first the organization is itself a validator, an object of trust; later it becomes an arena in which trusting relations are enacted and organizational interaction serves as its own reward.

ORGANIZING SECRECY

Trust, which is connected directly to mutual support, contributes to cohesion. In general, the more trust, the greater the degree of cohesion (Stokes 1983).¹² Secrecy is not implicated so obviously in the development of group feeling because, on the surface, it separates individuals. Trust depends on a willingness to share knowledge and experience. Secrecy, like trust, is linked to information and to relationships, but it privileges information (Luhmann 1989) and implies that relationships will be competitive (Bellman 1981). Trust is one of the prime *synthetic* forces of a social system; secrecy, at first glance, is its *analytic* equivalent. Trust represents the midpoint between certainty and ignorance—sufficient knowledge to recognize what constitutes legitimate information and who provides it. Secrecy represents the two endpoints: keeping knowledge for oneself while keeping others in ignorance.

Secrecy, and the accompanying deception, may be necessary for smoothing social order (Nyberg 1993), for managing impressions (Goffman 1967), and as a means of social control (Luhmann 1989; Redlinger and Johnston 1980; Wilsnack 1980). Even though concealment of information can impose heavy burdens on social systems and individuals (Bok 1983), raising questions of ethics and participation, secrecy also protects valued resources. Secret societies represent the institutionalization of secrecy (Erickson 1981), but secrecy is also endemic in many organizations embedded in systems of internal or external competition.¹³ One can examine effects of organizational secrecy under two conditions: when members of organizations attempt to keep certain information from

¹² A point may occur at which too much trust will not promote belonging because an independent contribution to the group would become impossible. With continued dependency, personal interest may not develop fully.

¹³ We recognize the fine line between information that is termed private and that which is secret (Bellman 1981; Shils 1956; Warren and Laslett 1977); secret information often refers to that which is valued negatively by those from whom the information is shielded. The knowledge discussed here might be defined as private, although mushroomers themselves refers to their shielded information as "secret." Because the information we will discuss is public *in principle*, and is information to which others wish access, we find it legitimate to designate the shielding as indicating secrecy. Our operational definition merely denotes the concealment of information to which others wish access, and which is potentially public.

those outside the organization (external secrecy),¹⁴ and when members of organizations keep information from other members (internal secrecy). We are concerned here with the latter.

Secrecy is particularly evident in those leisure worlds which operate in conditions of scarcity and competition, and in which comparison of participants is encouraged.¹⁵ Despite the communal, subcultural features of leisure, and because of the potential scarceness of the prize and the zero-sum quality of the quest, mushrooming, like other competitive subcultures (e.g., Hummel and Foster 1986; Mitchell 1983:5; Stuller 1989), has an air of secrecy. Competitive social worlds are structured such that few see a contradiction between protecting information and establishing close bonds. For mushroomers, resources are scarce and certain kinds of knowledge contribute directly to obtaining these resources. Under these circumstances, transaction costs limit the information that individuals share voluntarily, unless the relational context outweighs the value of keeping information private.

How can secrecy both divide and unify? How does the existence of a robust and accepted class of secrets within a group—"a community of secret holders"—permit and

even encourage continued allegiance? Part of the answer is found in what Bellman (1981: 21) terms "the paradox of secrecy." This paradox is the fact that secrecy is constituted by the procedures by which secrets are communicated; in other words, it is defined by the *telling* of secrets in "appropriate" contexts and relations. Secrecy is governed by implicit rules, and in this sense is normative. The telling of secrets on certain occasions builds community among members: when enough members privately communicate secrets, everyone eventually becomes a holder, a giver, and a recipient of secrets. As with trust, information leads to the development of relationships. An economy of secrets exists by virtue of their breach.

Not all secrets are transmitted, however. Community is built not only by the occasional spread of information, but also by keeping it. This secrecy depends on the assumption that over time, all members will have secrets which they will keep, and that none will lack the resources (e.g., places to pick mushrooms) necessary to succeed. The underlying assumption is that mushrooming need not be a zero-sum game: although particular specimens may be picked only once, numerous unpicked mushrooms await energetic collectors.

In practice, mushroomers describe their experiences in lengthy narratives ("treasure tales"); they merely exclude relevant details, thus preventing others from gaining access to the same locale (Rey 1994). When all participants operate in this way, a community of secret holders can share each other's triumphs and frustrations as well as a sense of comradesly competition—judging oneself against others. In such cases, relationships are based on the legitimation of privileged information.

Keeping Secrets

Secrecy, on its surface, opposes the assumption that all members of the group have the interests of others at heart (Richardson 1988:209). This centrifugal force is mitigated in those circumstances in which all participants keep secrets from others while sharing protective knowledge. This process has been observed in those occupations in which individuals strive for scarce resources but require a general sharing of information to protect themselves, such as commercial

¹⁴ In the most obvious and most acceptable context for secrecy, a group member encounters an outsider, and doesn't tell or misleads that person. The other, being a stranger, has no right to obtain information. The legitimacy of secrecy toward outsiders is evident in the stories that mushroomers tell about deceiving anonymous others as to what they are looking for and what they have found (see Fine 1987). These stories are relished when retold within the group.

Diane mentions that one day she was picking morels. Exiting the woods, she met two well-dressed businessmen who were going into the woods to pick morels. Diane reports: "They asked, 'Did you find any?' and I said, 'No, there weren't any. This is a bad place.' And they got in their cars and left." Club members laugh loudly (field notes).

Secrecy strengthens the organization by emphasizing its boundaries (Bales 1970), as is necessary for collective identity. The members shield secret information from those who are excluded, thus emphasizing their mutual allegiance.

¹⁵ Mushroomers compare the number of mushrooms (especially morels) that they have collected. As one collector told me, "You go out and think you've had a wonderful day, and you come back and find people have picked a hundred pounds. Sometimes it tends to be less for its own sake than for the sake of stashing away hoards of morels" (personal interview). Like fishers, mushroomers have bragging rights.

fishermen (Ellis 1986; Palmer 1990; Thorlindsson 1994). The voluntary segregation of knowledge among all members of a collectivity preserves relationships. The drawing of boundaries around one's own preserve of information is expected, and the friendly competition that results is recognized as part of the satisfaction ("fun") of sharing an avocation with people about whom one cares (Donnelly 1994).

The recognition of a paradoxical relationship between secrecy and sociability is evident in humor, which reveals ambivalence about hiding information in a group that defines itself as a community. Joking permits the "processing" of this ambivalence:

Jerry, the club president, in adjourning a meeting at the end of morel season, jokes: "Why don't you share your favorite spots now that the season is over? We'll put them on slips and next year give everyone a slip. Don't give any bum spots." Of course, nothing is done about either of the suggestions; spots are used by members from year to year (field notes).

The president may tease members about sharing, while knowing that it is precisely the absence of sharing which makes members interested in each other's experiences and narratives.

Members offer an ethical justification for the secrecy: they claim that they prefer the satisfaction of finding mushrooms for themselves, which provides a sense of personal accomplishment. As one member commented,

Something's worth as much trouble as it takes to get it. This is true of learning to find mushrooms. I've told people to do some searching, and have them put forth an effort so they'd appreciate more (personal interview).

The assumption is that each member can or should discover spots; although spots are rarely shared, everyone finds mushrooms. This is not entirely true, however, particularly for new members who haven't found spots and may not even know where to look. As a result, most clubs sponsor forays that allow members to find morels, chanterelles, and other prime edibles; give longtime members the opportunity to identify and compare a wide range of mushrooms, as well as socializing with friends; and teach novices which habitats and natural indicators to look for (such as other plants that bloom concurrently), so they can develop their own

"secrets." Aside from forays to public areas, novices quickly learn that they will not be given specific locations; rather, members share enough general information about indicators of edible mushrooms so that novices can discover mushroom spots themselves. Jokes effectively socialize novices to group expectations:

A novice collector asks Jerry where he should go to find morels. Jerry responds, "In the woods." Then he seriously describes indicators of morels, such as poison ivy, bedstraw, and prickly ash (field notes).

Once burned, the initiate quickly learns to use similar mocking remarks (and helpful information) to train those who arrive later.

In some sense, finding mushrooms is ultimately a zero-sum game, even though the game can be expanded by the search for new spots. Yet if you pick a patch of mushrooms, no one else can find that same patch, at least in that fruiting. You "own" your spots, particularly because many species appear annually in the same location.¹⁶ They are valuable resources. Morel spots in particular are "owned" and are not shared or given lightly, because of their scarcity, the short fruiting season, and their economic value. When I asked one mushroomer about his concept of secrecy, he referred to his morel spots:

[The morel grows] one particular time of the year for a very short time. It happens to be an edible and hard to find, and we work hard to find them. The reason you don't usually just give it to somebody else is the hours it took you to find it. I've put in some tough days (personal interview).

If one shares the location of a patch of morels, the other person may reach that location first in the following year.

To maintain their spots, some collectors deliberately cover with leaves the stems of the mushrooms they have picked, so that others will not learn that mushrooms grew in the area. Others, recognizing this game, look for piles of leaves as a sign that mushrooms may be underneath (field notes). One mushroomer explained that although he tells others the direction from the Twin Cities where he finds

¹⁶ Because ownership is secret, it is possible that several people may have the same spot. This is a source of frustration when someone discovers that their spot has been picked.

morels (e.g., "east of here," "way up north," "by the Mississippi"), he will not name the *county* in which the mushrooms were found (personal interview).

The value of secrecy is underlined in the humorous attempts to make members divulge information. An intense joking culture flourishes among mushroomers in which they jocularly attempt to make others reveal the locations of their finds, particularly morels (Rey 1994). Mushroomers speak of a transitory hearing disorder that they label "morelitis":

Howard says that he found a lot of morels yesterday. Another club member asks where, and Howard doesn't answer at first, then jokes that he has "morelitis," adding "there is a temporary disease which we get called morelitis, which involves a temporary loss of hearing" (i.e., when someone asks where you found morels). He explains that he was northeast of Forest Lake, but won't be more specific than that (field notes).

This discourse emphasizes shared understandings of mushroom etiquette. One must respect another person's informational preserve, thus building the relationship, as indicated by these joking remarks:

Helen and June are talking at the national foray about picking morels. Helen (from Minnesota) tells June (from Pennsylvania) that she finds morels right across from her house. June asks: "Where do you live?" (Both laugh) (field notes).

Jerry describes a foray that he plans to lead near his summer home: "I won't take you to my favorite [chanterelle] spots, but I will take you to [my friend's] favorite spots" (field notes).

This concern is also expressed seriously when one fears that the person one is addressing might get the wrong idea about the nature of the questioning:

Donna has brought some very large Sulfur Shelves, a prime edible. Dave asks: "Where did you find these?" Then he quickly adds: "On what kind of tree?" (Indicating that he is not asking their location) (field notes).

At the national foray Mary (who visits Philadelphia often) asks John (from Philadelphia) where he finds mushrooms: "Where do you go outside Philadelphia? You don't have to tell me specifically. I'm just curious." John tells her the small city near where he picks (field notes).

The elaboration of these questions reflects "motive talk" (Hewitt 1989)—justifications

and disclaimers—that ratifies the shared assumptions about appropriate informational preserves. Without these accounts, the listener could assume the questioner's social incompetence, either novice status or cultural marginality.

Sharing Secrets

On occasion, secrecy is explicitly abrogated; thus the legitimacy of secrecy in other circumstances is emphasized. Mushroomers occasionally share their spots with others; this sharing indicates the normative boundaries of secrecy. In some cases, sharing otherwise secret information is a group policy, as when a mycological society schedules a foray to a public place.¹⁷ "Held" information also can be transmitted privately, however, and occur within a developed or developing relationship. The structural sharing of information over time becomes linked to relationships.¹⁸ This sharing reflects a special act of friendship, cementing a social tie.

Mark tells me that he doesn't begrudge Jerry the 800-1000 morels Jerry finds on his father's property, because at the end of last season Jerry told him about one of his other morel spots he hadn't used (field notes).

This mushroomer made the model of exchange explicit in the context of a relationship:

Mark tells me, "I must have found fifteen pounds of those things [Matsutakes]. It was one of the best mushroom-pickings of my life. It was like another world." After he told me he had given the spot to a friend, he added, "I returned an old debt. I had been picking his spots for a number of years" (field notes).

Sometimes spots are given privately to new members who seem enthusiastic—a symbolic gesture of acceptance and an indication that

¹⁷ This approach is taken by the Humboldt Bay Mycological Society:

Beginning this year *Mycolog* will feature a regular article on what fungi are fruiting and where to collect them. This column will help novices follow the season and will provide "well-publicized" collecting places, for we know the old hands already have their secret spots (*Is It Mushrooming Yet?* 1983).

¹⁸ I found little pooling of spots among friends (that is, spots to which two nonrelatives have access). Mushroomers may invite close friends to visit their spots, but the spots belong to the sharer.

they are judged to be committed to the activity. In addition, spots may be shared when a mushroomer decides that he or she is no longer interested in picking a particular species or plans to leave the community. The gift indicates the “ownership” of the spot and the control over the resource. In the latter case, one’s mushroom spots are labeled a “legacy” or an “heirloom” (Lonik 1984:10), which makes this leisure group analogous to a family. In the transfer of such knowledge, the recipient acknowledges the giver’s status. As noted, such a gift ideally should be reciprocated through some exchange—for example, the trade of a morel spot for a spot where Hen of the Woods mushrooms are found or, as often in cases of status difference, an expression of respect. Occasionally a member invites another to a favorite spot to have companionship: such a “gift” implies some measure of reciprocity.

Members are not *entitled* to all information by belonging. Such entitlement is outside the legitimate privileges of participation, despite ideals of trust and communion; it represents an extra-organizational tie, although that tie depends on the organization to give it meaning. Occasionally the special relationship implied by the sharing of private information may provoke mild friction among members:

Jerry tells several members that he picks Hen of the Woods in Theodore Wirth Park. Jerry says that Dave “gave” him the trees one fall when Dave had stopped picking there. Harvey, an older man who lives near the park, is very interested, but when he asks Dave where he found the Hen of the Woods, Dave is noncommittal: “I just go around everywhere.” Harvey tries to get him to be more specific, but Dave remains vague (field notes).

The legitimacy of withholding information allows relationships within the club to retain their power rather than being reduced to homogenized sharing. In addition, there are limits on what can be done with the information that is provided. Sometimes members give others “limited” access to spots that they themselves still use, as when the other member is treated as a “guest.” The information that is acquired from the invitation is “provisional” and should not be shared or used without permission.

Jerry tells me that he is annoyed with Howard. Jerry had shown Howard some of his chanterelle

spots, and then the next week without telling him, Howard visited these spots. This particularly annoyed Jerry because it was on someone else’s land: “I don’t know why he did it. I asked him not to” (field notes).

The guest does not “own” and should not use the secret knowledge that has been acquired. Expectations related to the fair distribution of scarce resources dictate what information can be kept secret without affecting the trust that is part of the relationship. Sharing the secret exemplifies the trust among members; if relationships are to remain strong, the secret must not be abused. Personal information enters into a private relationship. In a stable, tight-knit organization, a network of such relationships collectively ties members to each other in a complex web. If secrets are localized in a few dyads or small groups, fragmentation or cliquishness may result.

Socialization to Secrets

Voluntary organizations must determine how to socialize novices to prescribed “moral” behavior. If new members wish to be viewed as competent, they must learn which knowledge they should reveal to others; the location of their “spots” should remain closely guarded. This norm contradicts an ideology of communion, suggesting that nothing should be held back from the “brotherhood.” Many enthusiastic new members, embracing this perspective, wish to tell everyone what they found *and* where they found it. One mushroomer commented wistfully:

At first I wanted to share information, but no one else did, so [my wife and I] stopped. It was kinda sad, but it was like putting pearls before swine (field notes).

Another described a personal experience that convinced her of the need for secrecy:

I now practice the same form [of secrecy], which I did not at first . . . until I “learned better.” I used to show anybody who was interested where and how to pick morels and other species . . . until one day I showed a person my *Pleurotus ostreatus* log . . . loaded . . . I wanted to get a photo of this before harvesting and the person knew this . . . but couldn’t hold himself back long enough. He had cut off almost all the mushrooms before I had safely put the camera and lenses away—and the result was I got only a handful of mushrooms

off "my own" (note I use a possessive phrase for a wild log) log (letter to author).

This mushroomer is sensitive to the irony of considering public land as "her own." Even so, she accepts the validity of secrecy, given the structure of the leisure world. Although some individuals feel that the need for secrecy is unfortunate, its practical value is widely accepted.

Novices also wish to communicate their spots to others to demonstrate that they are competent. In fact, however, such sharing only announces their novice status and demonstrates their ignorance of cultural spots.

Jerry, the club president, asks if anyone knows any place the club might foray. A woman in the audience responds: "I know a wonderful place for shaggy manes . . . Literally thousands and thousands." Jerry jokes: "I'll give you my phone number [meaning he wants to keep the information for himself], . . . You don't have to give us your best foray spots." The spot is not mentioned again (field notes).

When one returns from the hunt, it is bad form to tell anyone, even one's nearest and dearest, the precise location of a Real Find (should there be one). The location of a find may be offhandedly reported as somewhere within 60 miles of the precise spot (Ms. Mushroom 1984: 29).

One should be able to describe the find for the enjoyment of one's colleagues, but should provide little information as to its location. Novices must learn not to share too much.

As is often the case, social control is communicated effectively and efficiently through humor (Seckman and Couch 1989). Socialization to secrecy is evident when a less sophisticated member asks a veteran where he or she found a patch of mushrooms. "Outside" is a frequent response. Secrecy seems to contradict the idea of leisure community, but novices must recognize quickly that the existence of secrecy does not suggest the absence of interpersonal and collective concern.

COHESIVE TIES

In a study of Mensa, the organization for high-IQ individuals, Aldrich (1971) proposed the existence of a class of groups he terms "sociable organizations." These organizations provide settings in which voluntary "communities of rapport" develop (Hether-

ington 1994; Schmalenbach 1977). Groups that engage in serious leisure (Stebbins 1992) are particularly likely to form tight-knit organizations. These are groups that we join because we choose to do so. Unlike some voluntary organizations (notably marriage), sociable organizations allow us to choose how much time we wish to spend without serious complications. They are "ungreedy" institutions (contra Coser 1974).

Like Goffman's concept of fun in games, participating in a sociable organization must be rewarding over time; the lack of institutional reward justifies disengagement. The attitude toward the organization differs from that toward the activity itself, which typically has an elaborated rationale. The organization is viewed as the means to the activity, and few people would suggest that one should continue to participate in a sociable organization one did not enjoy. In theory the organization is tangential, while the activity is essential. How are such organizations stabilized? How is group cohesion generated in the face of forces, such as secrecy and the recognition of danger, that militate against continued involvement in group life?

First, a group must generate trust so that individual members facing danger are willing to leave life-and-death decisions in the hands of colleagues (or, in other leisure groups, willing to accept information that may be of economic or social consequence). Patterns of interaction must create confidence that the other members of the organization (and the organization itself, as reflected in the leadership) share interests and operate to support each other. Members must be trusted to provide protective information. This trust is evident even while members compete and hide information from each other. The information that is hidden would be available to all members if they wished to devote sufficient time and effort; the information that is shared exemplifies the process, though not the outcomes, of successful performance (information on *how* and *what* to collect as opposed to *where* to collect).

Secrecy, though it appears to be centrifugal, binds members together in providing for friendly competition—an arena of fun, reflected in narrative. That others care about their colleagues' successes and failures suggests that the relationships are meaningful. Secrecy provides ground rules for this game, given scarcity and the possibility of effort. To

be competitive implies incorporating knowledge and skills that differentiate oneself from others. Participants enjoy this competition and the resulting secrecy; it permits them to judge themselves against group standards, incorporating the experiences of others. The group trains the novice to the point where he or she can find collecting spots without aid. This perspective on socialization assumes that locations for mushrooms need not be scarce, and are limited only by the effort one wishes to invest. (This is also assumed under most circumstances in a society that operates with the metaphor of a free market.) The model of a zero-sum game applies only when one believes that the number of sites cannot be expanded. Such a perspective is key in defining the organization.

In view of the importance of relationships and information preserves, trust in others and shielding of knowledge are compatible. The link between trust and secrecy supports group cohesion while leaving room for personal investment. Collective spheres of knowledge are compatible with private information, which in turn creates a satisfying competitive culture among those who are perceived as sharing interests. The community of secrecy depends on the recognition of trusting relations and on the fact that others can be trusted not to hold back information that might be protective. If one did not trust one's colleagues' claims as to how many mushrooms they collected from their secret spots (at least to a degree; "fish stories" are not unknown), much of the interpersonal satisfaction of competition would be lost.

Trust plays an important role because this case study involves some personal risk. In many or most voluntary worlds, however (and in many nonvoluntary worlds as well), members rely on others for information that will protect them from costs and embarrassments. A comparative analysis of dangerous and secure worlds may illuminate how trust operates similarly and differently in groups. Likewise, the types of secrecy found in competitive groups (e.g., hiding resources or not sharing techniques), mentioned above, certainly determine what information is shared. Competition is not antithetical to group cohesion; it provides a consensual basis for competence on which status is built. Members become friends over time, and

although turnover occurs among peripheral members, the stability of core members is impressive.¹⁹

This analysis has taken mushroom collecting as a model for the relationship between trust and secrecy, but the relative influence of trust and secrecy may vary among groups. Groups grounded on competition and lacking dramatic consequences may give greater weight to secrecy than those in which consequences are real and omnipresent, and in which trust must continually be publicly displayed. The relationship structures within a group vary according to the salience of trust and secrecy. At the same time, each group may be a community grounded on personal commitment, which is translated in turn into group cohesion.

CONCLUSION

In this analysis we portray how the dialectic between individual and group interest can be resolved through the paradoxical compatibility of private action with collective concern. Trust and secrecy, in our view, are pervasive and necessary features of social order; they are present in virtually every situation in which interactants care about the doings of others.

Beyond voluntary groups that facilitate dangerous leisure, this linking of trust with competitive domains is part of culturally valued scripts. Contexts of open and closed awareness can coexist together (Glaser and Strauss 1967). In typical service encounters, for example, customers often do not share extra change with cashiers, and cashiers may be silent about items of poor quality. Within their relationship, however, each expects and trusts the other to avoid forgery, violence, gross harassment, and claims of financial dishonesty. Tact is based on trust and secrecy. In family life, children and parents are

¹⁹ In comparing the 1981 and the 1982 membership lists, I found that 69 percent of members (64 of 93) who had been in the club at least two years in 1981 (i.e., were not new members) continued their membership; only 48 percent (20 of 42) of the new members continued their membership the following year. These figures, however, undercount the actual renewal rate because many members did not renew their membership until late in the year, although they continued to participate in club activities. By the end of most years, approximately 200 members had paid dues. Twenty-nine members in 1982 remained members in 1992—a real core, in view of mobility and morbidity.

supposed to hide some doings, even while ensuring that their kin are able to pursue life, liberty, and happiness. Even the routine relationship between mugger and victim, although filled with surprises and hidden knowledge, often follows a script that parties should be able to trust. When we believe that this script is likely to be violated, the city becomes a much more frightening place for all parties. If routine interaction is to proceed, trust must exist in its routine basis, even though information may be withheld which permits parties to achieve their goals in the face of competition for resources. Trust and secrecy—and open and closed information systems—operate within the same social web.

No one doubts that people like to think of themselves in cohesive, communal terms, as trusting in each other, committed to the group, and accepting democratically adopted policies. In practice, however, access to information and relationships differs according to one's social position. The culturally valued scripts that allow for the simultaneous existence of trust and secrecy may not be fully available to all members of society. In fact, they may never be made explicit but may remain largely taken for granted. This situation protects the cultural framework from being contested or challenged and thereby preserves the cultural constructs of allegiance and initiative (Moscovici 1993).

In some ways, voluntary leisure worlds represent the larger society. Mushroomers feel no special *obligation* to share their resources with others, and permit some to go without; this perspective is often expanded to economic spheres. For instance, some individuals with material resources consider improper the demand that they provide for those with fewer resources; they assume that what is achievable for one should be achievable for all, with sufficient effort. The *means* by which success is attainable should be taught; the *results* should not be equalized. Friendly competition can become friendly fire. Not being expected to share, we preserve resources for those we perceive as having the motivation to achieve such goals, even while we accept the belief that we are tethered together. If trust and secrecy are to function together, a floor must be established, below which those without resources and the means to acquire them cannot be allowed to sink.

The link between communal allegiance and individual initiative is effective in voluntary

scenes, in which few people question its legitimacy. Yet, we might question its effectiveness in those social systems in which membership is not voluntary and in which access to resources depends on the presence or absence of structural barriers. In an "information age," in which access to knowledge is power, this relationship between trust and secrecy may weigh more heavily on some (the resource-poor) than on others, preventing the development of relationships necessary for navigating in a complex, differentiated world.

The examination of leisure worlds is only a beginning. The analysis of trust and secrecy needs to be expanded to those groups which depend on explicit social control and on access to external resources, and in which the exit costs are far greater than those found in forests and fields.

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