

what is security?

- the techno-geek answer:
 - cryptosystems, access control, intrusion detection
- the 132 answer:
 - security is about managing risk
 - risks can come from many sources
 - failure as well as malicious damage
 - *managing* risk rather than *eliminating* risk
 - the most secure system is one that can't be used
 - there's an inherent tension between security and practicality

why is it important?

- security for internal needs
 - protecting against failure or attacks
 - ensuring robustness and ability to deliver
 - failure recovery is costly!
- security for competitive advantage
 - customers require secure services
 - clients won't trust us with their information
 - everyone else is doing it...

security is a system feature

- security issues arise at specific points
 - giving out credit card details
 - identifying myself
 - using passwords
- but... think about the *temporal* issues
 - electronic systems make ephemeral information permanent
 - accumulated information yields patterns
 - and patterns provide information that you never thought you'd disclosed

sources of risk

- hardware malfunctions
- software bugs
- data errors
- damage to physical facilities
- inadequate system performance

- the overriding question: *liability*

threats of computer crime

- theft
- unauthorised use
- entering fraudulent data
- stealing/modifying data
- modifying software
 - back doors
 - trojans
 - viruses

other factors

- increasing complexity
 - systems are growing larger and more complex
 - increasing interdependence between components
 - failure modes interact and multiply
 - example: Three Mile Island
- human limitations
 - memory
 - attention
- business pressures
 - do more and do it faster

security and trust

- we think we understand trust
 - everyday phenomenon
 - based on personal contact and experience
- trust in the electronic domain?
 - what are the cues that engender trust for us?
 - who do you trust?
 - paul@dourish.com?
 - jpd013902@hotmail.com?

security and trust

- security is *manufactured trust*
 - if I trust my infrastructure, everything is fine
 - but if I don't, I need to put something into place
 - security measures allow me to trust the system
 - making guarantees about integrity
 - detecting intrusions and problems
- aspects of security
 - authentication
 - authorisation
 - accounting

manufacturing trust

- authentication
 - “I am who I say I am”
 - password systems
 - challenge/response
 - smart cards
 - biometrics

manufacturing trust

- authorisation
 - “I can do this”
 - capabilities
 - absolute capabilities
 - inference systems
 - delegation
 - revokable rights
 - physical access

manufacturing trust

- accounting
 - maintaining an audit trail
 - the ability to reconstruct what's happened
 - the ability to “roll back time”
 - accurately logging and billing
 - managing scarce resources

manufacturing trust


- privacy
 - privacy is more than not disclosing information
 - knowing *what* I disclose, *when*, to *whom*, and *why*
 - these are the conditions on which I can make an informed decision
 - what happens when the policy changes?
- two issues in privacy
 - trusting the recipient
 - trusting the channel

security strategies

- “security through obscurity”
- open access, strong firewall
- secure channels
- layered security


cryptosystems

- private key encryption




cryptosystems

- private key encryption



cryptosystems


- public key encryption



cryptosystems


- public key encryption

- encrypt with the RECIPIENT's public key



cryptosystems

- public key encryption – digital signature
 - encrypt with YOUR OWN private key



cryptosystems

- technology is only part of the problem
 - it is well understood, but think about *implementation*
- infrastructure obstacles
 - how do I find someone's public key?
 - what and whom do I trust?
- legislative obstacles
 - governments don't approve
 - in turn, this affects the atmosphere in which adoption occurs
 - encryption is an international phenomenon
 - governments have little reason to collaborate
 - encryption is okay for us, but not for you

security and usability

- remember, this is about trust
 - trust isn't a technical phenomenon
 - trust is an outcome of someone's evaluation
 - so, it needs to be comprehensible to the end party
- the inherent tension
 - security involves putting up barriers
 - usability involves tearing them down
- which barriers to use?
 - example: email deletion

the usability of passwords

- an example of the tension
 - the system manager's view
 - passwords should be obscure and hard to guess
 - the user's view
 - passwords should be simple and easy to remember
 - common results...
 - people set the same password everywhere
 - passwords written on post-it notes

visualising system security

- security is an end-to-end phenomenon
 - modern networks are remarkably bad at handling end-to-end issues
 - when I connect to Amazon.COM, who is responsible for security?
 - when I login from home to read my email, where does security reside?
 - example – S/Key and SecurID

the cost of security

- remember cost-benefit analysis
 - what does some level of security cost?
 - adds complexity to implementation
 - imposes restrictions on use
 - limits performance
 - what benefits result?
 - secure *enough*
 - example: Placeless Documents
 - SSL-based security model
 - Java 2 security model
 - the dangers of all or nothing!

summary

- security is an increasingly important issue
 - more work moved online
 - increases risks
 - new domains for interaction with customers
 - increases need for mechanisms of trust
- security is risk management
 - supporting informed decision making
 - making consequences clear

next time

- project
 - due on Monday
- the week after next
 - review lecture
 - let me know if there are specific topics
- next week's topics:
 - e-commerce
 - case studies